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Abstract
Following the global financial crisis in 2008, the Federal Reserve implemented
unconventional monetary policy through near-zero interest rates and quantitative easing. This
unprecedented policy has had unintended consequences, including effects on capital flows to
emerging market economies. This paper studies the effect of U.S. monetary policy on portfolio
investment in the BRICS countries. Using exogenous and endogenous variables as determinants
of capital flows, I use a series of panel regression models that includes U.S. monetary policy as an
explanatory variable of portfolio investment in the BRICS countries. My results suggest that U.S.
monetary policy is not a significant determinant of capital flows in the BRICS countries, however
they do suggest that interest rate spreads on BRICS sovereign bonds and U.S. treasuries are
significant determinants.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The United States Federal Reserve System has a powerful influence over the global
economy. The Federal Reserve’s dual mandate of domestic price stability and employment
maximization is the central objective that drives its actions. However, as the central bank to the
world’s largest economy, the Federal Reserve’s policy decisions impact economies and markets
globally. Because of the global impact of its polices, the state of the world economy is a significant
factor that the Federal Reserve must consider when making policy decisions. The unprecedented
combination of increasing complexity of the world economy as a result of globalization and the
severity of the Great Recession required the Federal Reserve to implement unprecedented policies
to fulfill its dual mandate and consider its implications to foreign economies. While the Great
Recession demonstrated how shocks to the United States can affect the global economy, it also
showed how the Federal Reserve can dampen the impact of financial failure internationally. When
the Federal Reserve shifted to a highly accommodative monetary policy in 2008 dropping rates to
the zero-lower bound and resorting to a large-scale asset purchasing program, more commonly
known as quantitative easing, they accommodated a long and tepid recovery period that much of
the global economy is still enduring. Now, the Federal Reserve is starting to normalize policy with
the end of quantitative easing in October 2014, the first raising of the federal funds target rate of
interest by 25 basis points in December 2015, December 2016, and March 2017. While it is
favorable news that the U.S. economy is strong enough to handle a raise in the federal funds rate
target, the Federal Reserve must consider how these policy changes affect developing foreign
economies.
Many economists have started to examine this topic and have found that this highly
accommodative policy in the United States has resulted in large capital inflows to emerging market

4

economies (Arora & Cerisola, 2001; Bernanke, 2016; Bowman, Londono, & Sapriza, 2014; Chen,
Mancini-Griffoli, & Sahay, 2014; Georgiadis, 2016; Maćkowiak, 2007; McKinnon, 2013).
Because interest rates in the U.S. were lowered to the zero-lower bound and remain low at 75 to
100 basis points, investors receive little-to-no return on their investment. Investors then reallocate
significant portions of their portfolios to emerging market economies because they produce higher
returns. As banks in these emerging markets receive inflows, they have more reserves to lend out
to consumers and to businesses looking to expand. More workers are then hired to accommodate
growing businesses, thus lowering unemployment. As more people have disposable income,
demand for goods and services increases, consequently expanding the economy. The worry of
leaders in emerging market economies is that as the U.S. tightens policy, money will start to flow
out of emerging market economies, causing currency depreciation, higher unemployment, lower
demand for goods and services, and upward pressure on inflation (Bowman et al., 2014; Chen et
al., 2014; Arora & Cerisola, 2001).
In a speech in 2013, Ben Bernanke discussed how unconventional policy implemented in
advanced economies, specifically in the U.S., has affected emerging market economies via
complex channels. He describes how emerging market economies are concerned with:
…not only the level of domestic demand (as needed to achieve objectives for
employment and inflation) but with other considerations as well. First, because in
recent decades many of these countries have pursued an export-led strategy for
industrialization, they may be leery of expansionary policies in the advanced
economies that, all else being equal, tend to cause the currencies of emerging
market economies to appreciate, restraining their exports. Second, because many
emerging market economies have financial sectors that are small or less developed
by global standards but open to foreign investors, they may perceive themselves to
be vulnerable to asset bubbles and financial imbalances caused by heavy and
volatile capital inflows, including those arising from low interest rates in the
advanced economies (Bernanke, 2013).

5

While the inflow of capital brings many benefits to emerging markets as previously discussed, the
developing nature of emerging market economies creates complex reactions to easing in advanced
economies, both positive and negative. The externalities of tightening policy in advanced
economies causes greater concern than the direct effects of accommodative policy in advanced
economies on emerging markets (Chen et al., 2015; McKinnon, 2013). Figures 1 and 2 show how
portfolio flows have responded to the Federal Reserve’s large-scale asset purchasing program.
Figure 1 displays how the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet increased significantly in 2008 when
the Federal Reserve began quantitative easing (FRED, 2016). Figure 2 shows how portfolio flows
of the BRICS countries have been volatile since the Great Recession and the implementation of
accommodative policy, which were less volatile before 2000.
Figure 1: Federal Reserve Total Assets
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Figure 2: Portfolio Investments, BRICS
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William Dudley, the president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and the vicechairman of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), discussed this issue in a speech in 2014
when the Federal Reserve was starting to normalize monetary policy by cutting back quantitative
easing. He stated, “the scaling back of the Federal Reserve’s asset purchase program...has created
significant challenges for many emerging market economies.” Even though the Federal Reserve’s
mandate is confined to domestic goals, the role of the dollar as the global reserve currency gives
the Federal Reserve a unique responsibility to implement policy such that it advances global
financial stability (Dudley, 2014). The Federal Reserve must also recognize that the financial
stability of the world economy has implications that affect the U.S. economy. In another speech
Dudley gave in April 2015, he reinforced the importance of emerging markets’ economic health
and how the Federal Reserve must keep in mind the spillover effects of its policy. Specifically, he
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emphasized how “our monetary policy actions have global implications that feed back into the
U.S. economy and financial markets. In some cases, these feedback effects can be disruptive”
(Dudley, 2015).
To examine the relationship between U.S. monetary policy and capital flows to emerging
market economies that could have disruptive feedback effects in the global economy, I study U.S.
monetary policy as a determinant of capital flows to five of the largest emerging markets: Brazil,
Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS). I compare the effects of concurrent shocks with
lagged shocks by constructing a series of panel regressions, controlling for both time and country
fixed effects. The first panel regression model measures concurrent shocks with portfolio
investments to the BRICS countries as a fraction of BRICS GDP as the dependent variable, with
the monetary policy rate differential between the BRICS and the U.S. federal funds rate target and
large-scale asset purchases as explanatory variables, along with GDP growth differential,
sovereign spreads, inflation, and capital controls. My results show that, when controlling for time
fixed effects, the GDP growth differential is positive and significant. As GDP growth of the BRICS
countries increase by 1% relative to U.S. GDP, portfolio investments to the BRICS countries as a
fraction of GDP increase by 1.1%. When controlling for country fixed effects, the policy rate
differential is positive and significant. As the policy rates of the BRICS increase by 1% relative to
the federal funds rate target, portfolio investments as a percent of GDP increase by 0.6%. When
controlling for both time and fixed effects, all variables appear to be insignificant. The second
panel regression implements one lag period for the policy rate differential and large-scale asset
purchases. When controlling for time fixed effects, both the GDP growth differential and the
lagged policy rate differential are positive and significant. As the GDP growth of the BRICS
countries in the current period increases by 1% relative to US GDP growth, portfolio investments
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to the BRICS countries as a percentage of GDP increase by 1.4%. As policy rates in the BRICS in
the previous period increase by 1% relative to the federal funds rate target, portfolio investments
as a percentage of GDP in the BRICS increase by 0.7%. When controlling for both time and
country fixed effects all variables appear insignificant, however the coefficients are generally in
the predicated direction.
This paper contributes to the literature by comparing concurrent and lagged monetary
policy shocks while most papers solely focus on lagged shocks or concurrent shocks. Also, this
paper focuses on the relationship between the U.S. and the BRICS countries, which are the largest
developing economies in the world. How these countries react to U.S. monetary policy could have
a large influence on the global economy and could feed back into the U.S.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses reviewed literature
concerning U.S. monetary policy shocks’ effect on emerging markets; Section 3 discusses the data
used in my empirical analysis; Section 4 discusses methodology and specification of the model;
Section 5 includes my empirical results and how they compare to previous findings; Section 6
discusses globalization and policy implications; Section 7 concludes and provides suggestions for
further research.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW
I hypothesize that U.S. monetary shocks have significant spillover effects on the BRICS
countries, with larger spillover effects occurring after the Great Recession in 2008 when the
Federal Reserve implemented unconventional monetary policy such as near-zero interest rates and
quantitative easing. I divide the reviewed literature into four sections: the effect of U.S. monetary
policy on capital flows, the effect of monetary policy shocks on asset prices in emerging market

9

economies, the determinants of monetary policy spillovers into emerging markets, and the
spillover effects of U.S. unconventional monetary policy.
2.1 Capital Flows
Significant empirical studies have been conducted that provide evidence of U.S. monetary
policy spillover effects on capital flows to emerging markets. Ahmed and Zlate (2014) examine
the determinants of net private capital inflows to emerging market economies and if the behaviors
of capital flows from before the Great Recession differ from the behavior of capital flows after the
Great Recession. Their model differs from other current literature covering similar topics because
they use a panel regression rather than a vector autoregressive model. Many authors studying this
topic use a vector autoregression (VAR) model because it captures the dynamic nature of the
relationship between capital flows and monetary policy. A VAR model captures the
interdependencies within multivariate time series and allows for multiple dynamic variables.
Ahmed and Zlate (2014) however, use a panel regression. This provides justification for my use
of a panel regression. They use GDP growth differentials between emerging market economies
and advanced economies, monetary policy rate differentials between emerging market economies
and advanced economies, large-scale asset purchases as a measure of unconventional U.S.
monetary policy, global risk aversion measured by the Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility
Index (VIX), and capital controls as explanatory variables for net private investment as a share of
GDP in a particular developing country. They use panel data from 2002-2013 with countries from
Latin America and Asia (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, India, Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia,
Mexico, the Philippines, and Thailand). They conclude that growth and interest rate differentials
between emerging market economies and advanced economies as well as global risk appetite are
significant drivers of net private capital inflows to emerging market economies (Ahmed & Zlate,
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2014). They also find that since the financial crisis, investors have been more sensitive to interest
rate differentials between emerging markets and advanced economies, showing that slight changes
in interest rate differentials provoke large changes in capital flows. Unlike previous studies,
Ahmed and Zlate (2014) incorporate capital controls into their model and find that capital controls
implemented post-crisis have significantly dampened net inflows to emerging market economies.
While Ahmed and Zlate (2014) integrated new explanatory variables into their model, it
remains unclear why they chose to examine the countries they did, as these countries appear to be
selected randomly. They briefly discuss how emerging markets’ fundamentals are determinants of
capital flows, however they do not include any country characteristics in their model besides
capital controls. Also, their model assumes that interest rates in emerging markets are independent
of the U.S. federal funds rate, while some may be pegged to the U.S. rate. The authors show that
a study on this topic can be done without a VAR model, providing justification for why I am using
a panel regression. However, I include country characteristics in my model.
McKinnon (2013) presents a theoretical argument discussing the “hot money” inflows
emerging market economies receive when advanced economies implement highly accommodative
policy. The term hot money refers to capital that flows through financial markets from countries
with low interest rates to countries with high interest rates. McKinnon (2013) criticizes advanced
economies for taking on accommodative policies by lowering interest rates to the zero-lower
bound and focuses on the negative effects of large capital inflows on the global economy, which
is a unique approach compared to other current literature. His main argument centers around carry
traders who borrow money in low-interest rate economies and invest in countries with a higher
rate of return. These types of trades explain how the majority of capital inflows to emerging market
economies originate. When the interest rate differential between the U.S. and emerging markets is
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large, capital flows from the U.S. to emerging market economies increase, creating inflationary
pressures and currency appreciation in emerging market economies. Central banks in emerging
market economies are then forced to stabilize their exchange rate to keep exports competitive.
McKinnon (2013) focuses his argument on the U.S. and China, discussing China’s exchange rate
stabilization. He argues that China is forced to buy U.S. dollars to avoid currency appreciation
caused by large capital inflows from the U.S. (McKinnon, 2013). McKinnon (2013) continues to
argue that highly accommodative monetary policy in the U.S. is causing financial repression,
which refers to the actions governments take to reduce debt, in the U.S. and in China. However,
his arguments are strictly negative and fail to acknowledge the findings of current literature that
state how accommodative policy has had some positive effects on emerging market economies. He
does state valid points explaining the mechanics of capital flows from advanced economies to
emerging market economies that are relevant to this paper, such as the contribution carry traders
have towards capital flows. Also, McKinnon (2013) justifies my implementation of interest rate
differentials between the U.S. and BRICS interest rates as an explanatory variable in my model.
Banerjee et al. (2016) question the effectiveness of “self-oriented” monetary policy that is
implemented across the globe. Advanced economies like the U.S. that are at the “financial center”
of the global economy fulfill a domestic mandate that exclusively takes into account national
considerations (Banerjee et al., 2016). They specifically examine how U.S. monetary shocks affect
emerging markets’ GDP, policy rates, and capital flows. They implement a core-periphery
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model integrating monetary policy and financial
shocks in the core country whose currency dictates the flows of capital across borders to the
periphery countries. Banerjee et al. (2016) find that an unexpected tightening of U.S. monetary
policy (the core country) leads to decline in emerging markets’ (the periphery countries) GDP, a
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rise in policy rates, currency depreciation, and a fall in capital flows. These findings are consistent
with my hypothesis and further support my reasoning for predicting that a loosening of U.S.
monetary policy increases capital inflows from the U.S. into emerging markets like the BRICS
countries.
The recent spike in volatility in cross-country capital flows has provoked many economists
to examine the consequences of these large swings in capital flows from advanced to emerging
market economies, including influences on asset prices, which will be discussed in detail in the
next section. Chen et al. (2014) study how both capital flows and asset prices in emerging market
economies are affected by U.S. monetary policy shocks. They also examine if unconventional U.S.
monetary policy and conventional U.S. monetary policy have similar spillover effects and how
domestic economic conditions within emerging markets affect spillovers (Chen et al., 2014). In
this section I look at the contributions Chen et al. (2014) have made to literature concerning U.S.
monetary policy effects on capital flows and asset prices in emerging market economies, however
I will discuss the rest of their methodology and findings concerning unconventional policy in
Section IId. Chen et al. (2014) conduct an event study of U.S. monetary policy surprises, defining
the surprise as the difference in yield of the next expiring futures of the federal funds just before
an FOMC announcement and the target federal funds rate announced. The event study focuses
more on the short-term effects rather than the overall long-term trend that a VAR model captures.
They look at 21 countries, chosen based on market liquidity and international financia integration.
Chen et al. (2014) look at the day before and after a U.S. monetary policy announcement over
three time periods: January 2000 to July 2007 to capture conventional monetary policy, November
2008 to May 2013 to capture unconventional monetary policy while the Federal Reserve was
increasing quantitative easing, and May 2013 to May 2014 to capture unconventional monetary
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policy when the Federal Reserve was taper quantitative easing. Unlike previous event studies on
this topic, Chen et al. (2014) extend the time horizon across the yield curve, studying 1-year to 30year maturities. They also use two factors to explain the variation in U.S. bond yields: market
factor and signal factor. Market factor captures the portfolio rebalancing channel of monetary
policy, as well as forward guidance provided by the Federal Reserve. This communicates longterm risks or uncertainty about inflation, growth, or changes in central bank preferences (Chen et
al., 2014). Signal factor encompasses shorter-term indications concerning interest rate levels.
Because the Federal Reserve does not communicate their interest rate target plans for more than
three to five years in advance, signal factor captures changes in short-term bonds up to 5-year
maturities while market factor captures the rest (Chen et al., 2014). These two factors explained
99% of the variation in U.S. bond yields (Chen et al., 2014). To test the effect of U.S. monetary
policy on asset prices and capital flows, they use asset prices or capital flows as the dependent
variable and U.S. monetary surprises corresponding to market and signal factors as their
independent variables. Chen et al. (2014) then introduce country characteristics as standalone
variables and interaction terms.
Chen et al. (2014) conclude that U.S. monetary policy shocks significantly affect capital
flows and asset price variation in emerging market economies. Volatility in emerging markets was
especially significant when the Federal Reserve announced that it would begin tapering its
quantitative easing program in 2013 (Chen et al., 2014). Forward guidance from the Federal
Reserve concerning the future course of policy rates triggered larger spillover effects than
information that affects longer-term U.S. bond yields (Chen et al., 2014). Finally, Chen et al.
(2014) conclude that emerging market economies with stronger fundamentals receive smaller
spillovers from the U.S. More specifically, they find that higher real GDP growth, lower inflation,
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strong external current account positions, and more liquid local capital markets significantly
dampen the effects of U.S. monetary policy spillovers (Chen et al., 2014). I extend on this paper
by explaining why the U.S. must consider its monetary policy spillover effects on the BRICS
countries as the Federal Reserve begins to tighten policy and move away from accommodative
policy.
The literature discussed in this section supports my hypothesis that capital flows in
emerging markets are significantly affected by changes in U.S. monetary policy. This paper fits in
with this literature because I incorporate explanatory variables from all of these articles, including
the U.S. federal funds target rate, capital controls, and country characteristics like the GDP growth
gap and interest rate of the BRICS countries. I add to this literature by comparing the effects of
concurrent U.S. monetary policy shocks and lagged U.S. monetary policy shocks. Volatile capital
flows have unintended consequences in emerging market economies, namely influencing asset
prices and macroeconomic variables. The next section focuses on how asset prices and
macroeconomic variables in emerging markets are affected by changes in capital flows that are
caused by new U.S. monetary policy implementation.
2.2 Asset Prices
The strand of literature that focuses specifically on the influence of U.S. monetary policy
on asset prices and macroeconomic variables in emerging market economies relates to my research
as well. Many of these effects on asset prices are caused by the large fluctuations in capital flows
into emerging market economies from developed economies. I am not specifically examining the
effect of U.S. monetary policy on asset prices and macroeconomic variables in this paper, however
this section shows the effects large capital inflows and outflows can have on emerging market
economies and why capital flows are an important topic. Arora and Cerisola (2001) evaluate how
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country risk is influenced by U.S. monetary policy, country-specific fundamentals, and conditions
in global capital markets. Unlike other literature on this topic, Arora and Cerisola (2001) look at
secondary market sovereign spreads rather than the spread of new issuances. They also use the
U.S. federal funds target rate to isolate the effects of U.S. monetary policy specifically rather than
a yield on a U.S. treasury security. As theory predicts, a rate hike in the federal funds target rate
would also raise emerging market spreads (Arora & Cerisola, 2001). Because emerging markets
typically have a higher risk of default, and therefore are more risky, emerging markets spreads will
increase by more than the risk-free rate (or U.S. rates) rises (Arora & Cerisola, 2001). This
compensates investors for the risk they are taking by purchasing emerging markets assets. Rising
U.S. rates could also increase investors’ risk aversion, causing them to reduce their exposure to
emerging markets’ assets and leading to an increase in capital outflows from emerging market
economies (Arora & Cerisola, 2001).
Arora and Cerisola’s (2001) results suggest that levels of U.S. interest rates have significant
positive effects on sovereign bond spreads in emerging market economies. Also, they find that
both domestic fundamentals and whether the Federal Reserve is more accommodative or
contractionary are crucial to determining country risk (Arora & Cerisola, 2001). The authors
discuss globalization extensively, pointing out that the global integration of the world economy
has emerging markets’ dependence on the U.S. economy (Arora & Cerisola, 2001). As I discuss
in my policy implications section later, globalization has led to the increased integration of global
capital markets, which forces developing and advanced economies to take into account the policies
of other nations while determining their own.
Maćkowiak (2007) studies asset prices and how much external shocks account for the
variation in macroeconomic variables in emerging market economies. His primary focus is
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whether U.S. monetary policy shocks have a larger effect in emerging markets than the U.S. and
if these shocks are transmitted quickly or with delay. Mackowiak (2007) constructs a structural
VAR model to estimate the effect of U.S. monetary policy shocks on eight emerging market
economies. He uses two variables: the first is a vector of macroeconomic variables in the emerging
market and the second is a vector of variables external to the emerging market. The first vector
includes a short-term interest rate of the emerging market being tested, the exchange rate with the
U.S. dollar, a measure of real aggregate output, and a measure of the aggregate price level. The
second variable is a vector including the federal funds rate, a measure of world commodity prices,
a measure of the U.S. money stock, a measure of U.S. real aggregate output, and a measure of the
U.S. aggregate price level. He runs his model for eight emerging markets (Korea, Malaysia, the
Philippines, Thailand, Hong Kong, Singapore, Chile, and Mexico).
Mackowiak’s (2007) results show that external shocks are an important source of
macroeconomic variation in emerging markets and are robust for all eight emerging markets tested.
They account for about one half of the variation in the exchange rate and the price level, two fifths
of the variation in real output, and one third of the variation in the short-term interest rate. If the
Federal Reserve raises interest rates (a contractionary policy), the currency of emerging market
economies depreciates and induces rapid inflation, which is consistent with my hypothesis
(Mackowiak, 2007). He also finds that U.S. monetary policy shocks have sizeable spillover effects
but are not as important for emerging markets compared to other kinds of external shocks. U.S.
monetary policy shocks also explain a larger fraction of the variance in the price level and real
output in emerging markets than the price level and real output in the U.S. (Mackowiak, 2007).
The significant impacts U.S. monetary policy has on asset prices in emerging markets, as
shown by Mackowiak (2007) and Arora and Cerisola (2001), highlight why this is an important
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field of study. Policymakers in the U.S. and other advanced economies should be aware of the
global effects their changes in policy have on emerging markets and other nations abroad because,
as explained by William Dudley of the Federal Reserve during a speech in 2015, “...our monetary
policy actions have global implications that feed back into the U.S. economy and financial markets.
In some cases, these feedback effects can be disruptive.”
2.3 Determinants
Another strand of literature that pertains to my study is identifying determinants of U.S.
monetary policy spillovers into emerging market economies, and whether these determinants are
exogenous or endogenous factors. Bowman, Londono, and Sapriza (2014) examine determinants
of U.S. unconventional monetary policy spillovers on emerging market economies and how the
magnitude of these effects differ depending on country-specific characteristics. Using a VAR
model, Bowman et al. (2014) investigate sovereign bond yields, foreign exchange rates, and stock
prices in 17 emerging market economies and identify country characteristics that make emerging
market economies more vulnerable to U.S. monetary policy changes. To capture different channels
of monetary transmissions, they implement explanatory variables, including the 10-year U.S.
treasury yield to represent the interest rate channel and the 10-year U.S. high-yield bond yield to
capture the risk channel (Bowman et al., 2014). They also integrate a control variable that includes
the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) Volatility Index (VIX), a commodity price index,
and the return of the S&P 500. Country characteristics are broken down into four groups:
macro/fiscal stability, financial openness, currency related, and bank vulnerability. Macro/fiscal
stability includes the short-term policy rate, the 5-year credit default swap (CDS) spread, 1-month
sovereign bond yield, government debt to GDP ratio, real GDP growth, the output gap, and the
differential between the local 1-month interest rate and the U.S. 1-month interest rate; financial
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openness includes the Chinn-Ito measure of financial openness1, current account to GDP deficit,
total local stock market capitalization to GDP ratio, and total exports to the U.S. to GDP ratio;
currency related includes a dummy variable that equals 1 if there is an exchange rate regime in
place and a variable that captures whether the emerging market economy has a floating exchange
rate; bank vulnerability includes the asset weighted average of 5-year expected default frequency
(EDF) and asset weighted average of Moody’s 5-year spot credit category (Bowman et al., 2014).
Bowman et al. (2014) find that emerging market economies with high long-term interest
rates, 5-year CDS spreads, inflation rate, or current account deficit, and more vulnerable banking
systems receive larger monetary transmissions with a change in U.S. interest rates. Emerging
markets that are perceived as riskier are also more vulnerable to fluctuations in U.S. sovereign and
high-yield bond yields (Bowman et al., 2014). In addition to domestic factors affecting the
magnitude of spillovers, Bowman et al. (2014) conclude that U.S. monetary shocks have
significant influences on asset prices in emerging markets, especially sovereign yields in local
currency. More specifically, if a U.S. monetary policy shocks leads to a fall in U.S. sovereign
yields, emerging markets sovereign yields will also fall (Bowman et al., 2014). Bowman et al.
(2014) findings are consistent with my hypothesis that U.S. monetary policy shocks affect
emerging market asset prices, and I discuss their findings concerning unconventional policy in the
next section. Additionally, I use the U.S. federal funds target rate to capture U.S. monetary policy
rather than the 10-year U.S. treasury yield.
Georgiadis (2016) examines the determinants of global output spillovers from U.S.
monetary policy on emerging market economies. Differing from current literature, Georgiadis

1

The Chinn-Ito index of financial openness measures a country’s degree of capital account openness. It is based on
“the binary dummy variables that codify the tabulation of restrictions on cross-border financial transactions
reported in the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions.” (Chinn & Ito, 2014).
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(2016) implements a global VAR (GVAR) model between two countries, adding the dimension of
transmission channels and magnitude by incorporating country-specific characteristics. He finds
that the effects of U.S. monetary policy shocks are significant, and even larger in emerging markets
than in the U.S. economy. Georgiadis (2016) concludes that country characteristics such as
financial integration, trade openness, exchange rate controls, industry structure, domestic financial
market development, and labor market rigidities largely affect the magnitude of cross-country
monetary spillovers from advanced economies to emerging markets. For example, economies that
are more integrated in global capital markets, less integrated in trade, have higher labor market
rigidities, less developed domestic capital markets, and have manufacturing industries as a large
share of output will experience larger spillovers (Georgiadis, 2016). Also, the determinants of the
magnitude of spillovers differ across advanced economies and developing economies (Georgiadis,
2016). For example, advanced economies with strict exchange rate controls experience smaller
spillovers while developing economies that are more financially open are faced with larger
spillovers (Georgiadis, 2016).
Georgiadis (2016) discusses in depth the policy implications of his research. He argues that
emerging market economies can dampen the effects of monetary spillovers from advanced
economies by increasing trade integration, liberalizing exchange rates, developing domestic
financial markets, and reducing frictions in labor markets (Georgiadis, 2016). Unlike existing
literature which briefly mentions globalization, Georgiadis (2016) considers globalization to be a
primary cause of U.S. monetary policy spillovers into emerging markets. He cites how Ben
Bernanke’s announcement in 2013 that the Federal Reserve would consider tapering the amount
of large scale asset purchases it was conducting triggered global volatility and sell-offs of emerging
market economies’ securities (Georgiadis, 2016). Also, Georgiadis (2016) claims that because the
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U.S. has a unique role due to the dollar acting as the global reserve currency, U.S. policymakers
should consider internalizing monetary spillovers to increase global welfare. The question of
whether countries should coordinate monetary policy to reduce negative spillover effects is also
raised because spillover effects from advanced economies tend to have larger effects on emerging
markets than on their domestic economies (Georgiadis, 2016). Georgiadis (2016) provides
valuable insight on determinants of global spillovers from U.S. monetary shocks into emerging
market economies, providing evidence in line with my hypothesis that I can apply to the BRICS
countries.
Sarno et al. (2016) also analyze the determinants of spillovers, but look specifically at
whether push factors or pull factors have a greater influence on portfolio flows from advanced
economies to emerging markets. Push factors capture global, external factors that “push capital
from the U.S. to other countries,” including low U.S. interest rates, low potential U.S. growth, and
high risk appetite of global investors (Sarno et al., 2016). Pull factors, on the other hand, reflect
domestic economic forces that attract investors to buy assets of a particular country relative to
others, including high domestic interest rates, low domestic inflation, high growth potential, and
trade openness (Sarno et al., 2016). Sarno et al. (2016) conclude that for both bond and equity
flows, push factors explain more than 80% of capital flows movements while pull factors explain
less than 20%. These findings highlight how international economic forces dominate domestic
forces when interpreting variation in global portfolio flows (Sarno et al., 2016). More specifically,
Sarno et al. (2016) find that the most significant push factors are U.S. economic variables,
including U.S. output gap, the U.S. interest rates, and U.S. stock market performance. They find
that the most significant pull factors are domestic economic variables such as the recipient’s output
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gap, interest rates, and financial openness (Sarno et al., 2016). The theories and results presented
by Sarno et al. (2016) justify the use of many push and pull factors in my empirical analysis.
Byrne and Fiess (2016) conduct a similar study to that of Sarno et al. (2016) in which they
study whether global or domestic factors influence capital flows to emerging market economies.
Where this paper differs from Sarno et al. (2016) is that Byrne and Fiess (2016) additionally
determine which country-specific characteristics are most relevant to movements in capital flows.
Their results show that the main determinants for capital flows to emerging market economies
include both global and national factors. External factors consist of U.S. long-term bond rates and
global risk appetite (Byrne & Fiess, 2016). If U.S. long-term bond rates fall, capital will flow out
of the U.S. and investors will direct their capital to emerging market economies. If there is an
increase in global risk appetite, investors will also shift towards emerging market economies
(Byrne & Fiess, 2016). In line with other literature, Byrne and Fiess (2016) find that the
determining domestic factor of capital flows is financial openness. They also find that the quality
of institutions within an emerging market economy is significant, however I focus on financial
openness in this paper.
Reinhardt et al. (2013) also justify why financial openness is a significant determinant of
capital flows. In their study, they revisit the Lucas paradox which claims, contrary to neoclassical
theory, that capital does not flow from rich to poor countries even though developing countries
have lower levels of capital per worker (Lucas, 1990). Reinhardt et al. (2013) account for the role
of capital account openness and aim to explain the “failure” of the neoclassical model, which
predicts that capital flows freely across countries. Their results suggest that the prediction of the
neoclassical model does hold true when incorporating capital account openness. Among countries
that have capital account openness, developed economies experience capital outflows while
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emerging market economies experience capital inflows (Reinhardt et al., 2013). On the other hand,
for countries that have closed capital account, the development of a country has no relationship
with the behavior of its capital flows (Reinhardt et al., 2013). Byrne and Fiess (2016) and
Reinhardt et al. (2013) provide justification for why capital controls are a significant determinant
of capital flows and why I include them in my empirical analysis.
Canova (2005) studies determinants of U.S. monetary policy spillovers specifically in Latin
America, looking at whether policy transmissions occur through the interest rate or trade channel.
The author aims to quantify the contribution of U.S. shocks to domestic economic fluctuations in
Latin America (Canova, 2005). Canova (2005) implements a VAR model with a block of U.S.
variables, a block of each country’s variables, and a block of global variables that aim to capture
any comovements that occur that are not due to developments in the U.S. economy. His model
also includes an index of commodity prices, the emerging market bond index, and the emerging
market equity index to capture the state of the world economy or those influences independent of
the U.S. and Latin American developments that may cause comovements in the two regions
(Canova, 2005). His results show that U.S. monetary spillovers trigger large and significant
responses from Latin American macroeconomic variables. The interest rate channel, he concludes,
is a significant transmitter of U.S. monetary spillovers while the trade channel has lesser
significance (Canova, 2005). More specifically, U.S. disturbances also account for a significant
portion of the volatility in Latin American continental output and inflation comovements (Canova,
2005). U.S. transmissions also have important destabilizing effects on nominal exchange rates
(Canova, 2005). The theories presented in these papers are relevant to my argument concerning
how spillovers are transmitted from the U.S. into developing economies. However, I aim to extend
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these theories to the BRICS countries, as well as compare U.S. spillovers from conventional and
unconventional U.S. monetary policy.
2.4 Unconventional Policy
When the Federal Reserve lowered interest rates to the zero lower bound but still needed
to further stimulate the economy, they resorted to buying large amounts of longer-term government
securities and mortgage-backed securities while also providing increased forward guidance. These
unprecedented actions are called unconventional monetary policy. This section considers findings
about the effects of unconventional monetary policy spillovers on emerging market economies
from papers that were discussed in previous sections. It is important for policymakers in advanced
economies to know whether spillovers effects differ based on which monetary policy tool is
implemented. The “taper tantrum” in 2013, which refers to fleeing of capital from emerging
markets that occurred when Ben Bernanke hinted that the Federal Reserve would slow down
quantitative easing, sparked economists to study the effects of unconventional policy on emerging
market economies. In this section I will examine three articles that were discussed in previous
sections, however I will look solely at their results concerning unconventional U.S. monetary
policy.
Bowman et al. (2014) specifically examine the effect of U.S. unconventional monetary
policy on asset prices in emerging market economies and how the magnitude of these effects
differs depending on country-specific characteristics. They conduct an event study and calculate
the 2-day changes in sovereign yields, foreign exchange rates, and stock prices around U.S.
unconventional monetary policy announcement dates (from the day before the announcement to
the day after the announcement). Implementing an event study in this context captures the shortterm effects of U.S. monetary policy, in contrast to the long-term effects VAR models capture
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through lags. They find that U.S. unconventional policies have significant impacts on emerging
market economies, however this impact is not unusually different from typical spillovers that occur
during the conventional policy phase (Bowman et al., 2014). Bowman et al. (2014) results show
emerging markets’ aggregate sovereign yields index fell, currencies appreciated, and stock prices
rose after the first few Federal Reserve announcements concerning quantitative easing.
Chen et al. (2014) produce conflicting results, finding that unconventional policies result
in larger spillovers into emerging market economies compared to conventional policy spillovers.
Chen et al. (2014) study how capital flows and asset prices in emerging market economies are
affected by U.S. monetary policy shocks, however they additionally examine if unconventional
U.S. monetary policy and conventional U.S. monetary policy have similar spillover effects. Chen
et al. (2014) study three time frames: the conventional monetary policy phase (CMP) from January
2000 to July 2007, the unconventional monetary policy phase when the Federal Reserve
announced bond purchasing (UMP-P) from November 2008 to May 2013, and the UMP phase
when talks of tapering began (UMP-T) from May 2013 to March 2014. They looked at 74
announcements during the CMP phase, 42 over the UMP-P phase, and 9 over the UMP-T phase,
broken down into signal factors (capture expectations of future short-term policy rates) and market
factors (capture the portfolio rebalancing channel of monetary policy, as well as forward guidance
provided by the Federal Reserve communicating long-term risks or uncertainty about inflation,
growth, or changes in central bank preferences).
Chen et al. (2014) find that during the CMP phase, signal and market surprises were of
about equal size. During the UMP-P and UMP-T phases, market surprises were much larger than
the CMP phase, and signal surprises decreased to levels smaller than market surprises (Chen et al.,
2014). These results suggest that unconventional policy mostly conveyed information affecting
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longer-term bonds (Chen et al., 2014). Chen et al. (2014) conclude that spillover effects per unit
of U.S. monetary surprise are larger for unconventional policy shocks compared to conventional
policy shocks, with average and maximum UMP-T surprises smaller than UMP-P surprise for both
signal and market factors. These findings opposed Bowman et al. (2014) results.
Ahmed and Zlate (2014) analyze the effect of unconventional U.S. monetary policy on
capital inflows to emerging market economies. Using large-scale asset purchases as their measure
of unconventional U.S. monetary policy, they find a positive and significant effect on net capital
inflows, concluding that unconventional policies and conventional policies transmit through the
interest rate channel (Ahmed and Zlate, 2014). The authors also included the 10-year Treasury
bond yield within their explanatory variables for describing unconventional U.S. monetary policy,
finding a negative effect that suggests as long-term U.S. Treasury yields fall net inflows to
emerging market economies increase (Ahmed and Zlate, 2014). Overall, Ahmed and Zlate (2014)
conclude that interest rate and growth differentials, global risk aversion, capital controls, and
unconventional U.S. monetary policy are main determinants of net capital inflows to emerging
market economies, however do not explicitly compare spillovers between unconventional and
conventional monetary policies.
2.5 Contributions
My study relates to the reviewed literature by adapting Ahmed and Zlate’s (2014) model
and incorporating many of the variables used by the discussed studies. As mentioned in the
introduction, my main contributions include comparing concurrent U.S. monetary policy shocks
with lagged U.S. monetary policy shocks, incorporating country characteristics into Ahmed and
Zlate’s (2014) model, and focusing on the most dominant emerging market economies, the BRICS
economies. Because the BRICS countries are the largest developing economies in the world, the
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effect of U.S. monetary policy on these large economies affects the overall health of the global
economy. While this sample of countries may not be representative of all emerging markets,
especially small nations, I am not aiming to produce results that represent the entirety of emerging
market economies, but rather to show how U.S. monetary policy effects some of the most
important nations in the global economy.

3. METHODOLOGY
My empirical methods are based on Ahmed and Zlate’s (2014) methodology. Portfolio
investment to the BRICS as a proportion of GDP measures capital flows from the U.S. to the
BRICS. I implement the GDP growth rate differential between the BRICS countries and the U.S.,
the monetary policy rate differential between the BRICS and the U.S., and U.S. large-scale asset
purchases as explanatory variables of capital flows. Ahmed and Zlate (2014) and Arora and
Cerisola (2001) implement these variables in their models. Reinhardt (2013), Bowman et al.
(2014), Byrne and Fiess (2016), and Sarno (2016) all find that financial openness or the use of
capital controls is a significant determinant of capital flows into emerging markets, so I use Andres,
Klein, Rebucci, Schindler, and Uribe’s (2016) measure of capital controls. McKinnon (2013)
thoroughly discusses the importance of interest rate differentials to capital flows from the U.S. to
emerging markets. I use the interest rate differential between the U.S. 10-year treasury and the 10year sovereign bond of the BRICS countries as an explanatory variable as well. Bowman et al.
(2014), Georgiadis (2016), and Byrne and Fiess (2016) find that domestic characteristics are
important determinants of capital flows, leading me to include CPI to measure inflation and further
justifies the use of the GDP growth differential to capture any endogenous factors that could
explain capital flows from the U.S. to the BRICS countries.
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Most of the reviewed literature implements VAR models to study monetary policy and
capital flows because it captures the complex and dynamic nature of the relationship of these
variables. VAR models incorporate each variable as a function of past lags of other variables and
past lags of itself. While I use a panel regression rather than a VAR model, which is justified by
Ahmed and Zlate (2014), I implement lagged variables in a second model to capture similar effects
of a VAR model. Because monetary policy can have a delayed effect on capital flows and asset
prices in foreign countries, it is important to incorporate time lags of the independent variables
into the model.
I also incorporate fixed effects into both the non-lagged and the lagged regressions to
control for heterogeneity. I run three non-lagged regressions and three lagged regressions, each
controlling for various fixed effects. I then compare the two sets of three regressions to see whether
the lagged had a larger influence on capital flows than the non-lagged.2
3.1 Specification
The models adapted from Ahmed and Zlate (2014) are:
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𝑃𝐼#$
= 𝛼( + 𝛽+ 𝐺𝐷𝑃#$ − 𝐺𝐷𝑃$/0 + 𝛽1 𝑅#$ − 𝑅$/0 + 𝛽3 𝐼𝑅𝑆#$ + 𝛽5 𝐿𝑆𝐴𝑃/08 + 𝛽9 𝐶𝐶#$ + 𝛽; 𝐶𝑃𝐼#$ + 𝜙# + 𝛾$ + 𝜀#$
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(1)

= 𝛼0 + 𝛽1 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 − 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑈𝑆
+ 𝛽2 𝐿. 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝑈𝑆
+ 𝛽3 𝐼𝑅𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝐿. 𝐿𝑆𝐴𝑃𝑈𝑆𝑡 + 𝛽5 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6 𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝜙𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡
𝑡
𝑡

(2)

where Equation 1 examines concurrent shocks and Equation 2 examines lagged shocks. The
dependent variable
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is the portfolio investments in a country i during time t as a proportion of

GDP (Y); 𝐺𝐷𝑃#$ − 𝐺𝐷𝑃$/0 represents the GDP growth rate of one of the BRICS countries minus
the U.S. GDP growth rate; 𝑅#$ − 𝑅$/0 represents the central bank policy rate of one of the BRICS
countries minus the U.S. federal funds rate target; 𝐿. 𝑅#$ − 𝑅$/0 represents the central bank policy
2

I also ran three regressions incorporating the lagged monetary policy rate differential, lagged LSAP, the nonlagged policy rate differential, and non-lagged LSAP. The results are basically the same as those of the lagged
regressions so I do not include a separate discussion and results table.
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rate differential lagged by one year; 𝐼𝑅𝑆#$ represents the interest rate spread between the yield of
the BRICS 10-year sovereign bonds and the 10-year U.S. treasury yield. 𝐿𝑆𝐴𝑃/08 represents the
total assets held by the Federal Reserve and aims to capture unconventional U.S. monetary policy;
𝐿. 𝐿𝑆𝐴𝑃/08 represent large-scale asset purchases lagged by one year; 𝐶𝐶#$ represents the capital
controls implemented by a country; 𝐶𝑃𝐼#$ represents inflation measure of a country; 𝜙# captures
country fixed effects, 𝛾$ captures time fixed effects, and 𝜀#$ is a stochastic error term capturing
other factors that influence portfolio investments into the BRICS countries. The models are
estimated with robust standard errors. I hypothesize that the policy rate differential, the GDP
growth differential, the interest rate spread, and large-scale asset purchases will have a positive
effect on portfolio investments while capital controls and CPI will have a negative effect on
portfolio investments. These hypotheses are supported by the reviewed literature, specifically
Ahmed and Zlate (2014), Bowman et al. (2014), McKinnon (2013), Chen et al. (2014), and Sarno
(2016). I run a total of six regressions: three examining concurrent shocks and three examining
lagged shocks. Each set of three controls for fixed effects: the first with time fixed effects, the
second with country fixed effects, and the third with both time and country fixed effects. Nearly
all the sources cited in this paper use a VAR model to capture lags and the dynamic nature of
multivariate time series. I use a panel regression for the specification, similarly to Ahmed and Zlate
(2014).

4. DATA
I combine multiple datasets from numerous sources to create the dataset that includes all the
variables in the model. I use annual panel data from 2000 to 2014, yielding 65 observations. Many
datasets used exceeded this date range, however, I am limited to a common range of years in which
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all datasets overlapped. I considered looking at a subset of the BRICS to include a longer time
frame, but the dependent variable, portfolio investments, constrained me to this time period.
Portfolio investments data was collected from the Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook from
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), accessed through the World Bank World Development
Indicators: Economic Policy and Debt. I choose portfolio investments as a measure of capital flows
rather than a more general measure like capital account because this data specifically covers equity
securities and debt securities transactions, capturing the behavior of investors. GDP data for both
the U.S. and BRICS is collected by the World Bank Global Economic Monitor and is seasonally
adjusted. Central bank policy rate data is from the International Monetary Fund's International
Financial Statistics dataset. This dataset was quarterly so I average the four quarters of each year
to create annual data. Also, Russia only began reporting monetary policy rates in 2011, so I do not
have complete data for Russian policy rates. The interest rate spread data measures the amount of
basis points BRICS sovereign 10-year bonds are over the U.S. 10-year treasury. This annual data
is collected by the World Bank Global Economic Monitor. Data for large-scale asset purchases is
collected by the Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED) from the Federal Reserve Bank of St.
Louis, using total assets held by all Federal Reserve banks to capture the effect of unconventional
policy. The capital controls measure was collected from a dataset created by Fernández, Klein,
Rebucci, Schindler, and Uribe (2015) in an IMF working paper. This dataset has extensive capital
controls information regarding specific types of capital flows and whether they are inflows or
outflows. In this paper, I implement the Overall Restrictions Index that they created, which is
calculated by the average of total capital inflows and outflow of a country and captures all asset
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categories.3 I extracted this variable for the BRICS countries to use for my model. CPI data for the
BRICS countries was collected from the World Bank Global Economic Monitor. Table 1 shows
summary statistics for all the variables.4
Table 1: Summary Statistics
VARIABLES
Year
Country code
Portfolio investments
CPI
GDP growth differential (%)
Interest rate spread (bps)
Policy rate differential (%)
LSAP (millions $)
Capital controls

OBS
75
75
75
75
75
75
64
65
70

MEAN
2007
3
-0.013
88.553
4.40
284.33
6.074
1,831,262
0.728

STD. DEV.
4.35
1.42
0.049
24.363
4.06
249.29
4.915
1,188,021
0.235

MIN
2000
1
-0.243
31.741
-5.04
56.91
-2.998
725,800.5
0.2

MAX
2014
5
0.163
142.588
14.19
1372.68
23.327
4,337,664
1

5. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
5.1 Concurrent Monetary Policy Shocks
My first set of regressions examines concurrent U.S. monetary policy shocks, studying the
immediate effects of U.S. monetary policy on portfolio investments into the BRICS countries. I
run three regressions: the first controlling for time fixed effects, the second controlling for country
fixed effects, and the third controlling for both time and fixed effects. When running the first
regression with time fixed effects, the estimated coefficient for the GDP growth differential is
positive and statistically significant at the 5% level. The coefficients for the policy rate differential,
LSAP, and CPI are positive but insignificant, while the coefficients for the interest rate spread and

3

Fernández, Klein, Rebucci, Schindler, and Uribe (2015) measure capital controls by codifying the IMF’s Annual
Report on Exchange Rate Arrangements and Restrictions. They combine 55 different categories of restrictions,
ranging from bond and equity restrictions to real estate restrictions.
4
A note on variable units: GDP growth differential and policy rate differential are both in percentages while the
interest rate spread is in basis points. Portfolio flows is a proportion of GDP, so it is a percentage. LSAP are in
millions of USD.
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capital controls are negative and insignificant. The results from the second regression, controlling
for country fixed effects, producing different results. The policy rate differential is positive and
statistically significant at the 10% level. All other variables are insignificant. The coefficient for
GDP growth differential is negative, along with the interest rate spread and LSAP. When
controlling for both time and country fixed effects, all estimated coefficients appear to be
insignificant. However, most of the coefficients have the predicted direction. The GDP growth
differential and the policy rate differential both have positive coefficients, which is consistent with
my hypothesis. Table 2 shows the coefficients and the standard error in parentheses for each
variable, with asterisks indicating significance level.
Table 2: Results for Concurrent Shocks
Time Fixed Effects
(1)

Country Fixed
Effects
(2)

Time and Country
Fixed Effects
(3)

GDP growth
differential

0.011**
(0.004)

-9.46e-05
(0.004)

0.006
(0.007)

Policy rate
differential

0.003
(0.003)

0.006*
(0.003)

0.003
(0.005)

Interest rate
spread

-6.09e-09
(2.00e-08)

-2.54e-08
(2.32e-08)

-9.76e-09
(2.10e-08)

LSAP

2.37e-06
(6.87e-05)

-1.41e-06
(4.89e-05)

-2.50e-05
(6.19e-05)

Capital controls

-0.077
(0.068)

0.029
(0.042)

-0.034
(0.111)

CPI

0.0004
(0.0011)

0.002
(0.0014)

0.0002
(0.0011)

Constant

-0.035
(0.094)

-0.161
(0.138)

-0.011
(0.114)

51

51

51

0.430

0.334

0.505

VARIABLES

Observations
R-squared

𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑜 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑜 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑜 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠
𝐺𝐷𝑃
𝐺𝐷𝑃
𝐺𝐷𝑃

Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Although the results are mostly insignificant, they show interesting information about
capital flows from the U.S. to the BRICS countries. Theory and current literature suggest that the
GDP growth differential is a significant determinant of portfolio flows to emerging market
economies. In the recent low-interest rate environment in advanced economies, investors looking
for higher-returning assets shift towards developing countries with higher growth rates (Ahmed
and Zlate, 2014; McKinnon, 2013). The results show that the GDP growth differential has a
significant positive effect on portfolio investment when controlling for time fixed effects. As the
growth differential increases by 1%, portfolio investments as a percentage of GDP will increase
by 1.1%. These results are consistent with Ahmed and Zlate (2014) and McKinnon’s (2013)
findings who find that the growth differential between emerging market economies and advanced
economies is a significant driver of capital flows to emerging markets. While the growth
differential appears to be negative when controlling for country fixed effects, the coefficient is
extremely small, showing that even though the coefficient is in not in the predicted direction, it is
little effect on portfolio investment. The policy rate differential, while it is only statistically
significant when controlling solely for country fixed effects, has positive coefficients for all three
regressions. As the policy rates of the BRICS increase by 1% relative to the federal funds rate
target, portfolio investments as a percent of GDP will increase by 0.6%. Ahmed and Zlate (2014)
support these findings in their study, showing that the monetary policy rate differential in their
model is significant and positive.
Current literature suggests that as large-scale asset purchases (LSAP) by the Federal
Reserve increase, signaling that the Federal Reserve plans to continue to employ accommodative
policy and low interest rates in the U.S., capital flows to the emerging market economies would
increase (Ahmed and Zlate, 2014; Chen et al., 2014). However, my results mostly suggest the
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opposite and are insignificant. When controlling for time and country fixed effects, portfolio flows
to the BRICS as a percentage of GDP decrease by 0.0025% as LSAP increases by $1. While this
is an extremely small increase, LSAP occurs in massive quantities, so this could have somewhat
of a large impact. Also, these results are counterintuitive and oppose the findings of the current
literature concerning the effects of unconventional U.S. monetary policy on capital flows to
emerging market economies. Because I am aggregating and using panel data of five large countries
that differ greatly in characteristics. Each country is facing different economic conditions and they
are in turn implementing policy that is specific their situation. For example, Brazil has been
enduring political instability along with high unemployment (13.2% as of February 2017) and high
inflation. The Central Bank of Brazil, whose priorities focus on the purchasing power of the
Brazilian real and a sound financial system, has been focused on bringing down the inflation rate
over the past year, and it has succeeded bringing it down from 9.32% in May 2016 to 4.57% in
March 2017 (Central Bank of Brazil, 2017). Other factors within each BRICS economy could
affect how the BRICS countries conduct policy as well. The Russian and Brazilian economies are
similar in the sense that both rely on oil prices and have been struggling recently due to low oil
prices. Russia and China both have highly regulated economies that are controlled by the
government, which can have an impact on capital flows into their economy (Hutt, 2016). China’s
economy is also much larger than the other four BRICS economies, while South Africa is
significantly smaller. India surpassed China in economic growth in 2016 and has lower corruption
than Brazil, Russia, and South Africa (World Economic Forum, 2016). These factors affect the
attractiveness of each individual country to investors, and therefore can affect the volume of capital
flows to these countries (McKinnon, 2013). Because the political and regulatory characteristics of
the BRICS countries are so heterogeneous, my results are insignificant and inconsistent with
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current literature. Also, because the BRICS are such large countries, if one country has negative
results and other has positive, they could cancel each other out and lead to no significance.
Additionally, if I had access to data for a longer time period, I would expect the results to be more
supportive of my hypothesis.
The results show that CPI is insignificant but has a positive effect on portfolio investments.
However, I expect the coefficient to be negative. This finding opposes the findings of Sarno et al.
(2016) but support Bowman et al. (2014). Sarno et al. (2016) find that low domestic inflation
attracts investors to buy assets of a particular country. On the other hand, Bowman et al. (2014)
suggest that emerging markets with high inflation rate receive larger capital flows with a change
in U.S. interest rates. Mackowiak (2007) and Chen et al. (2014) generate results that can explain
the results I present in this paper regarding CPI. They find that higher inflation causes emerging
market economies to be more susceptible to capital flows and that increased capital flows induce
high inflation.
Capital controls are insignificant for all three regressions; however, the coefficient is
negative when controlling for time and country fixed effects, which supports my hypothesis that
as a country implements more capital controls, capital flows into that country will decrease.
Reinhardt (2013), Ahmed and Zlate (2014), Bowman et al. (2014), Byrne and Fiess (2016), and
Sarno (2016) all find capital controls or financial openness to be significant determinants of capital
flows. Increased financial openness (decreased capital controls) allows for a more integrated global
economy and possibly larger spillover effects.
5.2 Lagged Monetary Policy Shocks
My second set of regressions implements lag variables, specifically the two variables
capturing U.S. monetary policy, the policy rate differential and large-scale asset purchases, by one
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period. Because changes in U.S. monetary policy may not affect portfolio investments
immediately, implementing lags captures the delay in reaction time in portfolio investments. I run
three regressions, as I did for concurrent shocks; the first controlling for time fixed effects, the
second controlling for country fixed effects, and the third controlling for both time and fixed
effects. When controlling for time fixed effects, the estimated coefficients for the current GDP
growth differential and the lagged policy rate differential are positive and statistically significant
at the 5% level and the 10% level, respectively. LSAP is insignificant, however the coefficient is
positive, which is in line with my hypothesis that as Federal Reserve LSAP increases, portfolio
investments in the BRICS countries increase. Capital controls, CPI, and the interest rate spread are
not significant. When controlling for country fixed effects, none of the estimated coefficients are
statistically significant However, the coefficients for the GDP growth differential, policy rate
differential, interest rate spread, and capital controls are all positive, which is in line with my
hypothesis. When controlling for time and country fixed effects, none of the coefficients are
statistically significant, however, all are in the hypothesized direction except the interest rate
spread. Table 3 shows the coefficients and the standard error in parentheses for each variable, with
asterisks indicating significance level.
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Table 3: Results for Lagged Shocks
Time Fixed Effects
VARIABLES

Country Fixed Effects

Time and Country
Fixed Effects
(1)
(2)
(3)
𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑜 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑃𝑜 𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑜 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑜 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠
𝐺𝐷𝑃
𝐺𝐷𝑃
𝐺𝐷𝑃

GDP growth
differential

0.014**
(0.005)

0.003
(0.005)

0.011
(0.009)

Policy rate
differential (lag)

0.007*
(0.004)

0.001
(0.003)

0.010
(0.007)

LSAP (lag)

1.82e-08
(3.20e-08)

-2.19e-08
(2.25e-08)

2.84e-08
(3.49e-08)

Interest rate
spread

-2.04e-05
(9.10e-05)

0.001
(0.001)

-7.80e-05
(0.001)

-0.061
(0.081)

0.003
(0.045)

0.015
(0.101)

-7.06e-05
(0.002)

0.0012
(0.002)

-0.001
(0.001)

Constant

-0.092
(0.116)

-0.148
(0.145)

-0.098
(0.143)

Observations
R-squared

46
46
0.507
0.346
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Capital controls
CPI

46
0.568

The main difference between the concurrent monetary policy shocks regressions and the
lagged monetary policy shocks regression is that the estimated coefficients in the lagged
regressions are mostly larger than those in the concurrent shocks regressions. This difference can
be seen in the two significant variables, the GDP growth differential and the monetary policy rate
differential. In the non-lagged regression, the estimated coefficient for the GDP growth differential
is 0.011 and for the lagged regression is 0.014. For the policy rate differential, the significant nonlagged coefficient is 0.006 and the lagged is 0.007. Because the estimated coefficients are larger
in the lagged regression, U.S. monetary policy shocks, specifically changes in the federal funds
rate, have a larger effect on portfolio investment to the BRICS countries when lagged.
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My results show that when controlling for time fixed effects, the GDP growth differential
is positive and significant. When the GDP growth differential increases by 1%, portfolio
investment as a percentage of GDP increases by 1.4%. While the estimated coefficients for the
growth differential are insignificant when controlling for country fixed effects and both time and
country fixed effects, the direction is positive. These results support my hypothesis and are in line
with the findings of Ahmed and Zlate (2014) and McKinnon (2013). The lagged policy rate
differential is positive and significant when controlling for time fixed effects. As the policy rate
differential of the year increase by 1%, portfolio investment as a percentage of GDP increases by
0.7%. The policy rate differential is insignificant when controlling for country fixed effects and
when controlling for both time and country fixed effects, however both coefficients are positive
which supports my hypothesis. Ahmed and Zlate (2014), Arora and Cerisola (2001), Banerjee et
al. (2016), Bowman et al. (2014), and Chen et al. (2014) support this finding that the policy rate in
the U.S. and in emerging markets is a determining factor of capital flows.
My results concerning lagged LSAP are similar to those of concurrent LSAP, however the
coefficient is smaller when LSAP is lagged by one period. The lagged LSAP variable is
insignificant for all three regressions. The coefficient is positive when controlling for time fixed
effects and both time and country fixed effects, but negative when solely controlling for country
fixed effects. Current literature finds that as LSAP increases, capital flows to emerging markets
increase (Ahmed and Zlate, 2014; Chen et al., 2014). The results for the interest rate spread, capital
controls, and CPI are all insignificant and the direction of their coefficients is inconsistent across
the three regressions. I hypothesize that the interest rate spread is positive and CPI and capital
controls are negative. In the regression that controls for both time and country fixed effects, the
coefficient for CPI is negative, showing that as CPI decreases in the BRICS, portfolio investment
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increases. This supports my hypothesis and differs from the concurrent shocks results. The
coefficient for the interest rate spread is negative when controlling for time and country fixed
effects, which opposes my hypothesis and is consistent with the concurrent shocks results. Capital
controls is positive when accounting for time and country fixed effects, again opposing my
hypothesis and differing from the concurrent shocks results. The reasoning for my results is similar
to that explained in the concurrent shocks regressions. Because I am aggregating five large
economies that are heterogeneous, the results are scattered. Also, as Chen et al. (2014) mentioned,
larger countries receive smaller U.S. monetary policy transmissions because of their stronger
fundamentals. Because these are the five largest emerging market economies, U.S. monetary
policy may not affect them in the way that smaller countries are affected by monetary policy
transmissions.
There are limitations to my study that can be improved for future research. Firstly, my
sample size is small. As the results show due to the lack of significance when controlling for
country fixed effects, heterogeneity is present among the BRICS countries. Also, implementing a
panel regression rather than a VAR model could be a limitation as well. My models fail to capture
the feedback effects that a VAR model captures. Future research should incorporate a model that
does capture the important feedback effects of U.S. monetary policy shocks with a sample that is
less heterogeneous.

6. GLOBALIZATION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The dramatic increase in globalization over the past few decades has led to the
interconnectedness of the world’s financial markets (Arora and Cerisola, 2001; Georgiadis, 2016).
We are witnessing a “substantive deepening of trade and financial integration and associated
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increase in the relevance of spillovers to the domestic economy from shocks in other economies”
(Georgiadis, 2016). This integration highlights the importance of monetary policy spillovers and
the feedback effects they can have on advanced economies (Dudley, 2015). Georgiadis (2016) also
finds that, due to increased globalization, the spillover effects for emerging market economies are
larger than the domestic effects in the U.S. The magnitude of the spillovers largely depends on
characteristics of the country, including financial integration, trade openness, exchange rate
controls, industry structure, financial market development, and labor market rigidities (Georgiadis,
2016). This is consistent with my results, showing that country characteristics are significant
determinants of capital flows. Emerging market economies experience larger monetary policy
spillovers from advanced economies when they have more integrated global financial markets and
less integrated in trade. Because these policies produce more rigid labor and less developed
domestic capital markets, manufacturing industries account for a high share of their output, causing
these countries to experience larger spillovers (Georgiadis, 2016).
As globalization continues to expand, financial markets and economies will become
increasingly intertwined and heavily reliant on one another. Arora and Cerisola (2001) argue that
the “increased globalization of the world economy over the past decade has been reflected in the
increased dependency of emerging markets on developments in the U.S. economy.” Investors have
been pumping capital into emerging markets to diversify their portfolio and gain higher returns
because of changing conditions in developed economies (Chen, Mancini, & Sahay, 2015;
McKinnon 2013). Because of these intense capital inflows emerging markets are experiencing,
interest rate spreads have generally “moved in the same direction as changes in the U.S. interest
rates” (Arora & Cerisola, 2001). Emerging markets are increasingly influenced by changes in U.S.
monetary policy given the integration of global capital markets. Many of these changes are felt by
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emerging market economies through effects on the cost and availability of funds (Arora &
Cerisola, 2001). Also, they provide empirical evidence showing how U.S. monetary policy
influence country risk in several developing regions including Latin America, Asia, and Eastern
Europe. Arora and Cerisola (2001) obtain results that suggest U.S. interest rate levels have a direct
positive relationship with sovereign bond spreads.
Both the United States and emerging market economies can take measures to lessen the
effects of monetary policy spillovers (Georgiadis, 2016). My results suggest that central banks in
emerging market economies should be aware of the behavior of the Federal Reserve, specifically
on the movements of the federal funds target rate. Also, they should closely monitor the U.S. GDP
growth rate in relation to their own. Both of these indicators could determine changes in capital
flows in and out of EMEs. Also, increased forward guidance from the Federal Reserve would help
leaders in emerging market economies plan their own policy changes to combat high volatility of
capital flows. Other literature finds that emerging market economies can diminish their
vulnerability to US monetary policy by promoting domestic capital market development,
integrated global trade, and loosening exchange rate regulations (Georgiadis, 2016). Mishkin and
Savastano (2002) discuss the advantages and disadvantages of three possible monetary policy
strategies for emerging market economies in their case study on Latin America: hard currency
pegs, inflation targeting, and monetary targeting. Hard pegs, such as a currency board or full
dollarization, can be beneficial if there is already a sound banking and financial system as well as
sustainable fiscal policies in place (Mishkin & Savastano, 2002). For emerging market countries
that do not have the political and economic systems in place to support an independent central
bank, hard pegs may be the only suitable option for monetary policy. However, for other emerging
market economies, pegged currencies are “ill-equipped” to counter country-specific shocks and
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are difficult to exit (Mishkin & Savastano, 2002). For the five countries Mishkin and Savastano
(2002) examined, they view inflation targeting as a viable option for medium-term price stability.
As with hard pegs, a stable banking system is necessary for inflation targeting to be successful. If
emerging market economies are able to implement inflation targeting in coordination with the
government, it can help promote fiscal discipline. Mishkin and Savastano (2002) examine
monetary targeting but find that it is not a viable option for most emerging market economies
because of the inconsistency of the relationship between monetary aggregates and inflation. Also,
emerging markets would most likely come across the similar difficulties the U.S. did when
targeting the money supply, for example, defining and controlling the monetary aggregate they
were targeting (Mishkin & Savastano, 2002).
While the mandate of the Federal Reserve is specifically domestic, policymakers must
consider the interconnectedness of our global economy and financial markets given the role of the
dollar as the global reserve currency (Georgiadis, 2016). Evidence shows that changes in U.S.
monetary policy have significant effects on capital flows in emerging market economies which
then can feed back into the U.S. economy (Dudley, 2015). The implementation of accommodative
policy in the U.S. has forced investors to reach for yield, thus allocating more capital towards
emerging markets and causing large sums of money to flow into developing economies (Arora &
Cerisola, 2001; Bowman et al., 2014; Chen et al., 2014; Georgiadis, 2016; Maćkowiak, 2007;
McKinnon, 2013). As the U.S. tightens policy, capital flows will reverse and have serious
implications on the domestic economies of emerging markets, including currency depreciation,
upward pressure on inflation, and market volatility (Bowman et al., 2014; Chen et al., 2014; Arora
& Cerisola, 2001).
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7. CONCLUSION
U.S. monetary policy has spillover effects to foreign nations, specifically volatile capital
flows to vulnerable emerging market economies. While the Federal Reserve’s mandate is
domestic, it is important for the central bank to consider the effects its policies have abroad.
Volatile capital flows can have unintended consequences in vulnerable emerging market
economies, for example, increasing inflation, depreciating local currencies, and affecting asset
prices (Mackowiak, 2007; McKinnon, 2013; Ahmed and Zlate, 2014; Bowman et al., 2014; Chen
et al., 2014). While my results do not confirm that U.S. monetary policy is a significant determinant
of capital flows (contrary to previous studies), this is likely due to constraints in my study and
there are many opportunities for further research to be done on this topic. Because the BRICS
countries differ greatly from one another, my results are scattered. Using a longer time frame of
data and investigating a larger number of countries to make the data more representative of all
emerging market economies would help produce results that are more in line with my hypothesis
and other literature. Also, it would be interesting to see how capital flows to emerging market
economies behave since the Federal Reserve has started to tighten policy. I predict that emerging
market economies will experience outflows due to tightening U.S. monetary policy, however many
emerging market economies have stronger fundamentals that could make these countries less
vulnerable to changes in U.S. policy (Dudley, 2015).
As globalization continues to increase (unless the protectionist/isolationist movement in
the U.S. and Europe continues), understanding how policies in advanced economies affect
developing nations is important because these nations could have feedback effects into the U.S.
economy. The key for monetary policy stability and absorbing foreign monetary policy spillovers
in emerging market economies is to implement a strategy to achieve long-term price stability
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(Mishkin & Savastano, 2002). While not all monetary policy strategies will be successful for all
emerging market economies, it is crucial that governments of emerging market economies develop
a stable and sustainable institutional environment for its banking and financial system (Mishkin &
Savastano, 2002). Also, policymakers in emerging market economies can closely monitor the
federal funds target rate and the GDP growth in the U.S. because, according to my results,
determine the behavior of capital flows into the BRICS countries. From the perspective of the
United States, the Federal Reserve can continue to increase transparency through forward
guidance, providing leaders of emerging market economies guidance on the Federal Reserve
policy strategies.
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